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Abstract
In dynamic decision environments such as direct sales, customer support, and electronically mediated bargaining,
decision makers execute sequences of interdependent decisions under time pressure. Past decision support systems
have focused on substituting for decision makers’ cognitive deficits by relieving them of the need to explicitly
account for sequential dependencies. However, these systems themselves are fragile to change and, further, do
not enhance decision makers’ own adaptive capacities. This study presents an alternative strategy that defines
information systems requirements in terms of enhancing decision makers’ adaptation. In so doing, the study
introduces a simulation model of how decision makers learn patterns of sequential dependency. When a system
was used to manage workflows in a way predicted by the model to enhance learning, decision makers in a
bargaining experiment learned underlying patterns of sequential dependency that helped them adapt to new
situations. This result is rare if not unique in the study of dynamic decision environments. It indicates that a shift,
away from substituting for short-term deficits and toward enhancing pattern learning, can substantially improve
the effectiveness of decision support in dynamic environments. Based on the specific findings in this study, this
shift has important implications for designing information system workflows and potential future applications in
interface design.
Keywords: dynamic systems, decision making, sequential learning, decision support, e-business
1. Introduction
The growth of electronic and telephone-based communications has increased the preva-
lence of interactive dynamic decision tasks such as customer support, direct sales, and
electronically mediated bargaining. A distinguishing feature of these tasks is that decision
makers must execute sequences of interdependent decisions as the environment evolves.
For instance, over the course of a day, a telephone-based credit collector may face many
classes of delinquent debtors with whom she must bargain. The pitches required to con-
vince these debtors to resolve their delinquencies differ. Getting debtors to settle difficult
delinquencies with many interdependencies typically requires lengthy offer, counter-offer
sequences while simpler delinquencies may require only one offer.
The data indicate that inexperienced decision makers in dynamic environments ignore
these sequential dependencies, leading to poor performance (for reviews, see Sterman,
1994, 2000). One solution is to replace decision makers with software agents optimized for
specific tasks (e.g., supply chain management, Kimbrough et al., 2002). However, when
responses to particular sequences of decisions or the relevant sequences themselves change
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frequently, these agents become hard if not impossible to maintain, suggesting a continued,
important role for human decision makers (Beam et al., 1999).
We might be able to design systems to help inexperienced decision makers in dynamic en-
vironments with sequential dependencies if we better understood the root of their difficulties.
One hypothesis (the deficits hypothesis) is that decision makers in dynamic environments
have trouble with sequential dependencies because explicitly accounting for them exceeds
their cognitive capacity (Sterman, 1989a, 2000; Sweeney and Sterman, 2000). An effective
decision support strategy consistent with the deficits hypothesis is to have the information
system handle the computations needed to account for the dependency (e.g., Davis and Kot-
temann, 1995; Sengupta and Abdel-Hamid, 1993). However, systems based on this strategy
suffer from the same brittleness in evolving environments as narrowly defined software
agents.
Perhaps more importantly, the deficits hypothesis appears not to reflect skilled perfor-
mance. Skilled decision makers in dynamic environments with sequential dependencies
make decisions by recognizing features of past decisions in the current one and then recall-
ing a decision that worked well; an activity requiring comparatively little cognitive effort
and well-suited to the time constraints imposed by functioning dynamic environments
(Klein et al., 1993).
However this observation alone provides no guidance for how to design systems to
support and reinforce inexperienced decision makers’ recognition and recall abilities. As
a first step toward enabling such support, this paper develops a novel hypothesis about
how decision makers learn to recognize patterns of sequential dependency in the form of a
sequence-learning (S-L) simulation model. The S-L model significantly extends recent work
in sequence recognition (Cleeremans and McClelland, 1991; Rohde and Plaut, 1999) and
cognitive game theory (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). It focuses on how decision makers
learn to recognize sequences of cause and effect in highly interactive environments such
as direct sales, customer support, and bargaining. As such, it represents a fundamental
departure away from understanding decision makers’ support requirements purely in terms
of deficits and toward reinforcing capabilities that they bring to the task. As examined in this
study, this shift has important implications for designing information system workflows and
possible future application in interface design. The resulting impact on decision makers’
performance in an evolving dynamic bargaining environment examined here is extremely
rare if not unprecedented.
The next section reviews prior data on decision maker performance in dynamic decision
environments and develops the S-L model. After that, an interpersonal bargaining exper-
iment is conducted to test the S-L model’s recommendations for how to design system
workflows. Finally, limitations of this study are addressed, and the study’s implications for
system design are further elaborated.
2. Learning in Evolving Dynamic Environments
By definition, dynamic environments evolve (Brehmer, 1995). Within a given decision
episode, decisions early in a sequence may impact the effectiveness of later decisions
(Brehmer, 1995; Sterman, 1989a, 1989b). Further, between episodes, the length and
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interrelationships of dependencies between decisions may themselves change (Diehl and
Sterman, 1995).
Generally, decision makers in dynamic environments experience two short term prob-
lems that appear traceable to their limited cognitive capacity. First, decision makers have
difficulty integrating information into an appropriate cognitive framework that accounts for
the sequential dependency (Sterman, 1989a, 2000; Sweeney and Sterman, 2000). Second,
even if decision makers integrate the sequential dependency into an appropriate cognitive
framework, they have difficulty explicitly predicting its effects (Sterman, 2000).
Supporting these observations, in one recent experiment only 44% of subjects were
able to indicate the existence of a production lag in their formulation of an inventory
management problem, even though the lag was clearly identified in the problem description
(Sweeney and Sterman, 2000, Manufacturing Case). In this same group of subjects, only
10% were subsequently able to properly account for the lag when plotting inventory’s
future trajectory relative to orders. Similar patterns of findings have been reported for more
complex inventory management tasks (Davis and Kottemann, 1995; Diehl and Sterman,
1995), supply chain management (Sterman, 1989b), capital stock management (Sterman,
1989a), software project management (Sengupta and Abdel-Hamid, 1993), and firefighting
(Brehmer, 1995).
Decision support strategies that reduce demands on decision makers’ cognitive capacity
have been effective in improving decision makers’ short-term performance in these tasks.
When subjects acting as software project managers were supplied with a system that clearly
forecast the impacts of their staffing decisions, they appropriately adjusted staffing earlier in
the sequence (Sengupta and Abdel-Hamid, 1993, pp. 421–422). A similar intervention has
been shown effective in inventory management (Davis and Kottemann, 1995). However, de-
signing such systems requires extensive knowledge of the task environment that may not al-
ways be available or changes so frequently that it is hard to capture in a maintainable system.
Further, the performance of experienced decision makers in functioning dynamic envi-
ronments does not correlate with traditional measures of their cognitive capacity, leading to
some doubt that this is the problem to address (Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989). Experienced
decision makers engage in a cognitively less demanding cycle of observing the current
situation, recalling a similar past situation, and choosing from a small set of actions that
worked before in that situation; repeating this process as necessary (Klein et al., 1993).
Early learners appear much less skilled in recalling appropriate past situations (Sweeney
and Sterman, 2000). This difference between early learners and skilled performers has been
observed in air traffic control (Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989), emergency dispatch (Joslyn
and Hunt, 1998) and firefighting (Klein et al., 1993).
Although there is evidence that experienced decision makers in functioning dynamic
environments rely primarily on recall in making decisions, how novices can develop this
ability has not been well specified. Few, if any, attempts to develop information systems that
support this process have been documented. The next section develops the S-L model of
how decision makers in dynamic environments learn to recognize sequential dependencies.
This model appears unique: (1) in addressing how decision makers learn to recognize
sequential dependencies with experience in dynamic environments; and (2) in proposing
ways to improve this learning that can be incorporated into information system design.
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Figure 1. The S-L model. Details of the model’s functioning are contained in the text.
3. The S-L Model
Figure 1 shows the S-L model. It treats learning sequential dependencies as a process of
learning to associate patterns of events over time. In so doing, it makes use of a simple
analogy with the brain, common in cognitive neuroscience, in which its inputs, outputs, and
internal representations are conceived as patterns of activation across neurons (McClelland,
2001). The decision maker experiences and reacts to the patterns of activation but is not
assumed to explicitly perform the calculations that simulate them in the model.
A high-level interpretation of the decision processes captured by the S-L model is as
follows. First, the decision maker observes cues in the environment (stimulusk) and simul-
taneously combines this perception with previously noted higher level features (feat(j, t −
1)k ′), leading to an internal representation that may be composed of a number of higher
level features (featj). In the case of the credit collector, examples of the higher level features
formed through this process might be that the customer has said no twice already to offers
to fully resolve the debt; or that the customer has agreed to a partial resolution but has said
no to an offer to fully resolve the delinquency and now appears to be backing off the partial
resolution. The decision maker’s internal representation then feeds into his or her consider-
ation of which decision options (hi ) to favor, with different patterns of higher level features
tending to lend more and less support to different decision options (e.g., ask for more money
or offer easier payment terms). An option is then chosen in competition with other options
based on its relative support. As is common in cognitive game theory, the model assumes
that decision makers learn based on the success and failure of their decisions, with positive
reinforcement for successful decisions raising the conditional likelihood that they will be
chosen in the future (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).
3.1. Mechanics of the S-L Model
Making Decisions. Turning to the mechanics of the S-L model, as is common in studies
of repeated decision making, it assumes that decision makers’ task is to choose one of a
competing set of options at each decision point (Dienes and Fahey, 1995; Logan, 1988;
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Roth and Erev, 1995). The likelihood, acthi , that a given decision option, hi , will be chosen
from among m such options is based on the decision maker’s relative assessment of how





where weighted supi represents the weighted support an option is currently receiving from
the decision maker’s internal representation. Choice over options is then competitive, with
the winner determined by random selection over acthi , a frequent assumption in modeling
decision maker’s performance in sequential prediction tasks (Cleeremans and McClelland,
1991). Under this mechanism, when the decision maker has more than one option that has
worked in the past, it is as if he or she were wavering. When one option has consistently
succeeded and others not, this mechanism leads to more certain decisions.
weighted supi in Eq. (1) is calculated as the weighted,wi, j , sum of the activation of
higher level features, actfeat j , that form the decision maker’s internal representation of




input jwi, j where input j = actfeat j (2)
The activation of a given higher level feature indicates whether a set of stimuli in the
decision context that it represents have successfully predicted outcome of given decision
options in the past (Rumelhart et al., 1995). For instance, the activation of a higher level
feature representing that a customer has twice refused offers depends on how well it has
performed in predicting the success of different decision options. In the work reported here,
activation of features is a “stretched” binomial version of Eq. (1) frequently used to model
human performance in classification tasks (Rumelhart et al., 1995):
actfeat j =
2
1 + eweighted sup j − 1 (3)
where weighted sup j is calculated as in Eq. (2) but using stimuli, stimulusk , in place of
actfeat j , and weights, w j,{k,k ′}, connecting stimuli with higher level features in place of
wi, j .
Learning. In conformance with the well-known “law of effect”, decision makers learn
by adjusting their evaluations of decision options based on success or failure (Dienes and
Fahey, 1995; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Roth and Erev, 1995). Since the evaluation
of decision options is fully determined by the weights connecting stimuli to higher level
features and higher level features to decision options, learning is accomplished by modifying
these weights as in a number of studies that model human learning (Rumelhart et al., 1995).
First, the weights between the decision options and the higher level features are modified
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using the following rule:
wi, j = η(δi )(input j ) + wi, j (4)
where η is a learning parameter that can be set to determine the size of the weight change. In
this rule, δi is the difference between the outcome for a decision option, ti , and the model’s
estimated probability that decision option would succeed:
δi = ti − act(hi ) (5)




1, if hi chosen and success
0, if hi chosen and no success





, if h j =i chosen and no success
(6)
This assumption for ti is consistent with hill climbing because it indicates that decision
makers gravitate toward what has worked and away from what has not based purely on
current feedback (Sterman, 2000). The δ j for adjusting the weights between the feature
units and the stimuli is calculated as the weighted sum of the δi for the m decision options,




δi 2 actfeatj (1 − actfeat j )wi, j (7)
This δ j is then used to change the weights between the higher level features and the stimuli,
including the past values of actfeat j , by substituting the relevant values into Eq. (4).
3.2. Implications for Decision Maker Learning
As just described, the central assumption in the S-L model is that decision makers in dy-
namic environments represent situations by combining their current perceptions with their
representations of immediately prior situations. This representation process is essentially
one of recall. The weighted support internal representations of the current situation receive
is based on their past performance in predicting the success of decision options. The de-
cision makers’ representations then recall decision options based on these options’ past
utility in situations receiving that representation. Choice among decision options is then
competitive based on each option’s level of support. As such, the S-L model conforms to
and refines the observation that experienced decision makers in functioning environments
make decisions essentially through recall. By construction, the model does not account for
any effort decision makers may expend in lengthy reasoning since they are assumed not to
have the time in evolving environments.
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The internal representation step in the S-L model is an important theoretical refinement.
It implies that managing the flow of sequential dependencies the decision maker experi-
ences can facilitate learning. Since internal representations are partially based on previous
representations, starting with short sequential dependencies may be advantageous (Elman,
1990). Representations for these shorter dependencies can be learned more quickly and
thereby provide more coherent inputs to representations for longer dependencies. However,
implementing this progression by necessity reduces time spent learning the longer depen-
dency. It may therefore be more beneficial to start immediately with the longer dependency
so that learning time with it is increased. Which of these implications dominates for any
given dynamic environment must be derived empirically through simulation. Simulation
results then serve as behavioral predictions for human decision makers.
As detailed more fully in the experimental results section below, simulation with the
S-L model in a dynamic decision environment with sequential dependencies suggests that
time on task with the longest dependencies is critical to performance. Models that spent the
longest time in tasks with longer sequential dependencies were able to learn higher level
features of these dependencies. In later interactions, models were able to recognize these
higher level features in novel situations and make better decisions than models that had
progressed from shorter to longer dependencies.
4. Experiment
This section first describes the method used for subjects, a multi-day Internet bargaining task.
It then presents the S-L model’s predictions and compares them with actual decision makers’
learning in two conditions that test the effect of ordering the progression of sequential
dependencies on learning: (1) Evolving —Decision makers bargained with opponents whose
behavior evolved to include longer and longer sequential dependencies; (2) Consistent —
Decision makers bargained with opponents who consistently behaved according to the
longest dependencies observed in the Evolving condition.
4.1. Subjects Method
Thirty-six subjects participated in a four session bargaining experiment over consecutive
days. During the experiment, subjects’ bargaining opponents either accepted or rejected the
offers they made. The two experimental conditions, Evolving and Consistent, differed in
the response rules opponents used during the first three sessions of the experiment. Table 1
summarizes the progression of response rules by condition. In the Evolving condition,
opponents’ response rules progressed from having no dependency on the previous pattern
of offers and responses in the first session (0-offer rule), to depending on the last offer-
response pair in the second session (1-offer rule), and finally to depending on the sequence
of the last two offer-response pairs in the third session (2-offer rule). As described in more
detail below, the 0-offer and 1-offer rule were derived from this 2-offer rule.
In the first three sessions of the Consistent condition, subjects dealt only with opponents
using the 2-offer rule with no progression. In the fourth session, subjects in both the Evolving
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Table 1. Response rule progression by experimental condition. Control subjects
provided a comparison for evolving and consistent subjects in Session 4.
Evolving (n = 18) Consistent (n = 18) Control (n = 24)
Session 1 0-offer 2-offer NA
Session 2 1-offer 2-offer NA
Session 3 2-offer 2-offer NA
Session 4 2-offer-prime 2-offer-prime 2-offer-prime
and Consistent conditions dealt with opponents who responded differently (2-offer-prime
rule) according to the same sequential dependencies that conditioned the 2-offer rule.
For the first three sessions, this design led to three within-subjects measures of perfor-
mance crossed by the two between-subjects response rule conditions. In the fourth session,
subjects performance was measured in four consecutive intervals leading to a four-within
by two-between design.
To help determine whether response rule condition and experience influenced subject
performance in the fourth session, 24 control subjects were selected from the same subject
pool as Evolving and Consisting subjects and run in a one-day experiment where they
bargained solely with opponents who responded according to the 2-offer-prime rule.
4.1.1. Detailed Procedure. Subjects were recruited from among students at the University
of Michigan and paid $15 for each session they attended. There were no financial incentives
for performance, a fact that was not expected to affect the patterns of mean performance
between conditions (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
All sessions of the experiment took place using an Internet-based bargaining environ-
ment. Subjects came to a computer lab and used a web-browser to connect to a server that
supposedly allowed them to interact with other subjects. Similar interactive web interfaces
are becoming increasingly common in tasks requiring interpersonal interactions such as
bargaining, customer service, and sales.
At the start of the experiment subjects were informed that they would be playing the
role of debt collectors against other “debtor” subjects who were behind on their credit card
payments. These other subjects were in fact computer algorithms that generated the debtor’s
response according to the response rules outlined above and further described below. During
each session, subjects made contact with 20 different debtors whom they bargained with for
twelve speaker turns each. Subjects’ goal on each speaker turn was to get the debtor to agree
to pay as much money in as short a time as the debtor would likely agree to. As observed
in the functioning environment on which this task is based, even if debtors agreed to terms,
subjects had to continue bargaining (Gibson and Fichman, 2002; Sutton, 1991). Debtors
could grow noncommittal and reject terms already accepted (the reason they were delinquent
in the first place). Alternatively, they could evolve toward accepting more demanding terms
that would more quickly resolve the delinquency. Similar patterns of evolving sequential
dependency, widely observed in interpersonal negotiation, are an important challenge for
designing systems to support decision makers in these environments (Beam et al., 1999).
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Figure 2. A single debtor contact. The figure shows a hypothetical subject’s information display as she is selecting
her seventh offer. The labels L(ow), M(edium), and H(igh) are superimposed on the figure for ease of exposition
and were not displayed to subjects.
4.1.2. Bargaining Task Interface and Debtor Behaviors. Figure 2 shows the bargaining
task interface. On each speaker turn, subjects had four seconds to make their offer by
clicking one of three options: (L)ow ($100 in 8 days); (M)edium ($300 in 5 days); or
(H)igh ($900 in 2 days), and then clicking on a talk button. The short time frame and the
categorical decision making are typical of the functioning task environment as well as a
broader range of functioning environments such as police dispatch (Joslyn and Hunt, 1998),
air traffic control (Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989), and firefighting (Klein et al., 1993). After
that, subjects both saw on screen and heard through headphones the debtor’s response of
accept or reject to the offer.
General Debtor Behaviors. The debtor state transition diagrams (STDs) displayed in
figure 3 implemented the 0-offer, 1-offer, 2-offer, and 2-offer-prime response rules. In this
task, nodes in the STDs represented the debtor’s state resulting from the subject’s most
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Figure 3. Debtor state transition diagrams (STD) used in the experiment. Subject offers (L, M, or H) caused
debtors to transition to new states, with percentages indicating probabilistic transitions. Debtors always started a
given contact in the corner of the transition diagram marked by the dashed box. The “Rote best offer sequence”
for each STD indicates the sequence of highest offers with the highest probability of payoff.
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recent offer (arcs). The response heard by the subject was generated according to the node’s
label of accept or reject 90% of the time and the opposite response the other 10% of the
time.
For each node in each debtor STD in figure 3, there is one offer that leads to the high-
est payment with the highest certainty. This move can be referred to as the “best” move
for maintaining agreement from the subject’s perspective and corresponds to the goal sup-
plied to subjects in their instructions.1 The absolute number of best moves indicated sub-
jects’overall mastery of the system, perfect mastery indicated by all moves being best
moves. Positive increase in best moves was an indication that subjects were becoming more
proficient.
2-offer and 2-offer-prime Debtors. We focus first on the 2-offer and 2-offer-prime debtors
because they are related and because all the other debtor STDs were derived from the 2-offer
debtor’s STD. For debtors using the 2-offer and 2-offer-prime STDs, the best offer could
be determined with a high degree of certainty from the last two offer-response pairs.
The dependencies linking these offer-response pairs were based on foot-in-the-door
(FID), door-in-the-face (DIF), and good-cop-bad-cop sequential behavior patterns observed
in many bargaining environments (Cialdini, 1984; Gibson and Fichman, 2002; Rafaeli and
Sutton, 1991; Sutton, 1991). In FID, bargainers get their opponents to accede to a relatively
low request (e.g., L in figure 3) and then move them up to higher levels (e.g., M or H in
figure 3) that they could not have obtained on one request alone. In DIF, bargainers make
a burdensome request (e.g., H) that will almost certainly be rejected and then get their
opponents to accept a request (e.g., M) that they would not have accepted if made by itself
without the first request. In good-cop-bad-cop, bargainers respond to altering displays of
sternness and leniency that corresponds to making high demands (e.g., H) and then backing
off (e.g., to M) or vice versa (Rafaeli and Sutton, 1991).
A detailed examination of the 2-offer STD shows how FID and DIF combined with
good-cop-bad-cop can be used to produce plausible explanations for the sequential patterns
of debtor behavior that subjects had to learn to anticipate in order to perform effectively. In
this STD, debtors are at first unwilling to accept any offer until the subject has made a show
of compassion by offering L (good-cop). Even though 2-offer debtors reject this offer, it
primes them to accept a high offer (H) that will move them much closer to resolving their
delinquency (FID with initial rejection). 2-offer debtors will then accept one more H offer
before getting the jitters and rejecting a third H offer (delayed DIF). Even though an H offer
has been twice accepted, if subjects learn to pre-emptively back off to M (and not all the
way to L) they can maintain agreement at a reasonably high level and avoid having to start
all over building the debtor to agreement. In the functioning environment from which the
task was drawn, this twist corresponds to collectors’ observation that they had to maintain
urgency while intermittently backing down (bad-cop then good-cop, Rafaeli and Sutton,
1991). After the subject backs off for one offer, the debtor is both willing to entertain a
higher offer or completely abandon the negotiation (FID with hesitation). Similar reasoning
applied to the 2-offer-prime debtor who more closely followed DIF.
As indicated in figure 3, subjects could stay on the path of best offers with both the
2-offer and 2-offer-prime debtors by following a rote sequence that was different for each
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Table 2. Shared sequential dependencies between the 2-offer and
2-offer-prime debtors.
Evidence Likely debtor state Best offer
Accept(H ) after Accept(M) Accept(H1) H
Accept(H ) after Accept(H ) Accept(H2) M∗
Accept(M) after Accept(H ) Accept(M1) M
Accept(M) after Accept(M) Accept(M2) H
∗Subjects could pre-emptively lower their demands from previously
accepted levels after having learned to anticipate debtors’ tendency
to back out of high commitments and force subjects to start over from
the beginning with them (see text for details).
debtor. However, the repeating (overlined) portion of each debtor’s sequence was generated
by the same underlying sequential dependencies indicated in Table 2. For example, subjects
in the repeating portion of the sequence who had just had a high offer accepted after a
medium offer could infer with a high degree of certainty that their next best offer was high
(H) with both the 2-offer and 2-offer-prime debtors. Subjects who learned to recognize the
underlying pattern of sequential dependencies, as opposed to just the rote sequence of best
offers specific to the individual debtors, could transfer a high level of performance between
the 2-offer and 2-offer-prime debtors.
0-offer and 1-offer Debtors. The 0-offer and 1-offer debtors’ STDs represent full and
partial collapses respectively of the 2-offer debtor’s STD. As such, they were meant to
provide tasks in which feedback was more immediate and coherent internal representations
could be formed for later learning of sequential dependencies. In the context of the decision
environment on which the task is based, they represented debtors requiring simpler tactics
such as might be found in the earlier stages of delinquency (Sutton, 1991).
In the 0-offer STD, debtor responses were based solely on the subjects’ most recent
offer. This STD was derived by first tabulating how many times a given offer led to accept
across all seven nodes in the 2-offer STD and then dividing by the number of nodes. This
computation gave the unconditional probability that a given offer would lead to an accept
node, if all nodes were infinitely randomly sampled, an offer then randomly selected, and
its outcome node observed. The probability of a given offer leading to a reject node was
then computed by subtracting this probability from one, and the STD in figure 3(a) was
constructed.
For the 1-offer debtor, responses were based on the subject’s offer in conjunction with
the last offer-response pair. The derivation of the 1-offer STD was slightly more complex
because it involved tabulating according to four cases based on the immediately preceding
offer and the response it received: (1) any preceding rejected offer; (2) preceding offer low
and accepted (Accept(L)); (3) preceding offer medium and accepted (Accept(M)); and (4)
preceding offer high and accepted (Accept(H )).2 To compute the conditional likelihood of
a new offer leading to an accept node for each case, the number of times a given new offer
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led to an accept node was tabulated and divided by two if the offer could lead to both an
accept and a reject and one otherwise. The conditional probability of the offer leading to a
reject node was then one less this amount. Finally, the STD in figure 3(b) was constructed
using these probabilities.
4.1.3. Procedure and Task Summary. Evolving subjects went from debtors whose re-
sponses displayed no sequential dependencies to debtors whose responses depended on the
last two offer-response pairs. This progression was tantamount to using an information sys-
tem to manage subjects’ workflow so that they started with easier cases that then gained in
difficulty. By contrast, Consistent subjects started immediately with debtors who responded
to their offer in conjunction with the last two offer-response pairs, tantamount to using the
information system to manage workflows so that these subjects always bargained with the
same difficulty debtor.
From a theoretical perspective, Evolving subjects were given a chance to develop internal
representations of shorter dependencies before progressing to longer ones. Since the S-L
model’s formulation suggests that representations for shorter dependencies are the building
blocks for longer ones, this approach could aid learning. However, Consistent subjects were
not given the opportunity to focus first on these building blocks. Instead, they spent all of
their time trying to develop internal representations suitable to the longer dependencies.
4.2. Simulation Method
To produce predictions for human decision makers, 18 instances of the S-L model were
run in each of the experimental conditions and 24 in the control condition. Instantiating
the S-L model required: (1) determining the models’ representation of the offer options (H,
M, or L); (2) hypothesizing the representation of the information considered by decision
makers in making each offer; (3) and determining the number of higher level features the
model could recognize. To maintain the flow of the exposition, these points are addressed
in Appendix A.
4.3. Simulation and Human Subject Results
The S-L model provided predictions for decision makers’ best move performance. These
predictions can be evaluated: (1) by whether the S-L model correctly predicted the effects
exhibited by decision makers; and (2) how closely the model fit decision maker performance.
Predictions for the main effects of debtor type, learning trend, and the interaction of debtor
type and learning trend were calculated using 1 df contrasts (Judd and McClelland, 1989).
4.3.1. Pattern of Effects. Figure 4(a) shows the number of best moves models and subjects
made in the first three sessions of the experiment. In each session, performance was bounded
at 240 best moves with 80 expected based on random offer selection. Overall, model and
subject performance fell between these two bounds.
Models predicted that decision makers dealing with Consistent debtors would improve
between sessions one and three while those dealing with Evolving debtors would decrease
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Figure 4. Model and subject performance during training and transfer.
(t34 = −4.80, p < 0.001), and subjects confirmed this prediction (t34 = −5.93, p <
0.001). Further, the model predicted that decision makers dealing with Evolving debtors
would show a significant nonlinear trend in learning as characterized by the spike in per-
formance in Session 2 (t34 = 21.39, p < 0.001), again confirmed by subjects (t34 =
1.88, p < 0.05, one-tailed). Finally, models predicted that decision makers dealing with
Evolving debtors would underperform those dealing with Consistent debtors in the third ses-
sion (t34 = −17.4, p < 0.001) as was also confirmed by subjects (t34 = −4.63, p < 0.001).
However, a small number of Consistent subjects attained almost perfect performance by
the last session while no models did. As discussed below, attaining perfect performance re-
quired deterministic application of decision rules that generally only appears late in decision
makers’ learning, while by design the S-L model’s choice rule remains probabilistic.
Figure 4(b) shows models’ and subjects’ transfer and control performance. For each set
of 5 contacts shown in the figure, performance was bounded at 60 best moves with 20
expected based on random offer selection.
We first examine control performance and then contrast it with transfer performance.
The transfer task provided an opportunity to assess the extent to which models and subjects
just memorized rote sequences or learned the underling dependency displayed in Table 2.
For Controls, model performance was beneath the prediction for random guessing with no
significant linear trend in performance but a significant quadratic trend (t34 = 3.16, p <
0.01). This prediction was largely confirmed by subjects whose overall performance was
not significantly different from random guessing but with no significant trends.
In addition to differences between the two experimental conditions, of interest in transfer
is the degree to which decision makers with experience differed on average from relatively
naı̈ve decision makers in the control condition. The S-L model predicted that decision mak-
ers from both experimental conditions would significantly outperform controls during the
transfer task (t58 = −7.1, p < 0.001), and subject performance confirmed this prediction
(t58 = −4.07, p < 0.001). The model also predicted that decision makers who had bar-
gained with Consistent debtors during the first three sessions would significantly outperform
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those who had bargained with Evolving debtors (t34 = −3.68, p < 0.001), again confirmed
by subjects (t34 = −2.09, p < 0.05). Finally, the S-L model predicted that decision makers
in both conditions would show positive linear rates of learning (t34 = 6.51, p < 0.001)
that were greater than for controls (t58 = −3.64, p < 0.001) with no difference between
conditions. All three of these predictions were supported, with human subjects showing
positive learning rates (t34 = 4.50, p < 0.001) that were greater than for control subjects
(t58 = −3.46, p < 0.001) and no significant difference in rate between Evolving and
Consistent conditions.
4.3.2. Model Fit. The second indication of how well the S-L model predicted decision
maker performance was how closely it fit subjects and in which direction it deviated. For
the first three sessions, the model generally underpredicted subject performance (diff =
37.07, t35 = 5.76, p < 0.001) with the obvious exception of Evolving subjects in Session 2
(see figure 4(a)). Taking the difference of the squared residuals within subjects and then
computing the mean of this difference across subjects indicates that the model provided
a better fit for decision makers bargaining with Evolving debtors than Consistent debtors
(t34 = 4.56, p < 0.001).
Similarly, the model under-predicted transfer best-move performance (diff
= 14.47, t35 = 7.09, p < 0.001). In transfer, the model provided slightly closer fits
for Evolving than Consistent subjects (t35 = 1.89, p < 0.05, one-tailed). As indicated in
figure 4(b), a significant difference between both the S-L model and human subjects is that
some human subjects again displayed performance indicative of a perfect execution of the
underlying STD while no model instances did. The closest model instances only displayed
this behavior for 1/2 of their offers.
4.4. Discussion
The S-L model predicted all significant patterns in decision makers’ performance. As pre-
dicted by the model, decision makers dealing with Evolving debtors outperformed those
dealing with Consistent debtors in the first two sessions of the experiment, when their
debtors did not display sequential dependencies. This result partially replicates previous
findings where decision makers in tasks with shorter sequential dependencies outperformed
those in tasks with longer dependencies (Diehl and Sterman, 1995; Gibson, 2000). In Ses-
sion 3, when Consistent and Evolving subjects both bargained with 2-offer debtors whose
response rule depended on longer sequential dependencies, Consistent decision makers
outperformed Evolving decision makers.
This last result was not just due to the fact that Consistent decision makers had memorized
idiosyncrasies in debtors’ response patterns over the three sessions. As predicted by the
S-L model, Consistent decision makers also outperformed Evolving decision makers when
placed against a new debtor in Session 4 who displayed a different sequence of responses.
Consistent decision makers had learned the pattern of sequential dependencies shared
by the two debtors better than Evolving decision makers. Finally, even Evolving decision
makers who only had short experience with sequential dependencies outperformed Controls
who had no experience with sequential dependencies.
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For all of this success, the model underpredicted the overall level of performance decision
makers achieved, suggesting the S-L model does not provide a complete account of decision
maker behavior in this task. As further discussed under limitations below, by construction,
the S-L model is limited to an account of the role of sequential pattern discovery in decision
maker performance. Even with this limitation, the modelwas able to differentiate the im-
pact of two learning interventions designed to improve performance and suggest the most
effective intervention.
5. General Discussion and Conclusion
To describe how decision makers learn to account for sequential dependencies in evolving
dynamic environments, this paper developed the S-L model. As predicted by the S-L model,
decision makers’ ability to bargain against opponents who displayed significant sequential
dependencies was proportionate to the amount of time they spent bargaining with those
opponents. Starting with “easier” opponents who displayed shorter sequential dependencies
and building to “harder” opponents who displayed longer dependencies did not lead to more
effective learning. As further predicted by the S-L model, decision makers did not just learn
the rote sequences of behavior these opponents displayed. Rather, they learned to recognize
higher level features of their opponents’ behavior (signature patterns of interaction) that
enabled them to identify sequential dependencies and respond appropriately to them when
they encountered them in new opponents. This last result is rare if not unique in the study
of dynamic decision environments.
This work has several limitations that we examine before going on to a discussion of its
implications for information systems design.
5.1. Limitations
Limitations in this study relate principally to the task used and the modeling perspective
applied. While the task has many important elements of dynamic tasks, it has clearly
been simplified from the functioning environment on which it is based and is also simpler
than many other dynamic tasks. In particular, the task abstracts the interaction between
debtors and collectors to one of making offers and hearing responses. In the functioning
setting of credit collections, collectors do much more, for instance: engaging in informal
chit-chat to break the ice, specifically probing for information, making threats and giving
encouragements (Gibson and Fichman, 2002). The limiting focus applied here is justified
partly by the decomposition collectors themselves apply to their profession; they consider
bargaining a separable activity. Further, an analysis of interactions between debtors and
collectors in the functioning environment indicates that one of the most significant factors
in getting a debtor to discuss resolving his or her debt is proposing and re-proposing offers
(Gibson and Fichman, 2002).
Do these task limitations allow the work to address findings from generally more complex
environments studied elsewhere (e.g., supply chain management, Sterman, 1989b)? As
noted earlier, the almost uniform finding from these environments has been that decision
makers have trouble learning sequential dependencies. Decision makers in the task used
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here presented the same characteristics early in learning. Thus, the task, although simpler,
partially replicates these previous findings.
Further, the results reported here suggest time on task as a possible reason for decision
makers’ difficulty learning sequential dependencies in earlier studies. Diehl and Sterman
(1995) studied decision maker performance in repeated sessions with an inventory manage-
ment task where the length of the dependency changed between successive sessions, similar
to the Evolving condition in this experiment. Although Diehl and Sterman’s (1995) subjects
performance improved between sessions, they showed almost no improvement in their abil-
ity to account for sequential dependencies. The sequence learning process embedded in the
S-L model suggests that, like Evolving subjects in this study, Diehl and Sterman’s (1995)
subjects did not have sufficient experience dealing with any given length dependency to
effectively learn the higher level features that identified it.
Turning to the S-L model, its major limitation is that it was explicitly restricted to an ac-
count of how decision makers learned to recognize patterns of dependency between decision
instances. Accepting this limitation as an attempt at a first order approximation of decision
maker cognition appears warranted. Previous studies of performance in dynamic environ-
ments suggest that decision makers quickly toss aside theory-driven, explicit approaches in
attempting to achieve goals (e.g., Diehl and Sterman, 1995). Further, even decision makers
who are able to develop effective decision rules do so only after sustained periods of high
performance during which they are not able to state coherent rules (Stanley et al., 1989).
One possibility, consistent with the S-L model, for this last result is that until particular
decision options prove to be consistently effective, decision makers entertain more than
one possibility at each decision point, making it hard to state a rule. The S-L model’s
learning mechanism predicts that in environments where specific decision options prove to
be consistently effective, decision makers will tend more and more to these options, leading
to a systematic pattern of behavior. When decision makers are asked to reflect over this
consistent pattern of behavior shortly after periods of sustained high performance, stating
a rule, essentially just providing a description of their own consistent pattern of behavior,
should be easier. Just as the S-L model predicts that decision makers’ performance in
dynamic tasks is a function of their learning higher level features that consistently identify
sequential dependencies, so may be decision makers’ ability to state rules about how to
achieve high task performance.
5.2. Implications
To effectively support decision makers in dynamic environments, our conceptualization
of their capabilities is critical. To date, most decision support efforts have focused on the
deficits hypothesis: decision makers’ poor performance in dynamic tasks is due to their
limited capacity to explicitly represent sequential dependencies and forecast their effects
(Sterman, 2000; Sweeney and Sterman, 2000). The work reported here indicates that we
may profit by shifting our focus toward how decision makers learn to recognize and respond
to patterns of sequential dependency in dynamic environments. Such a shift has important
implications for designing information systems to support these decision makers, relating
primarily to workflow design with possible future applications to interfaces.
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First, the results reported here indicate that designing system workflows to enhance
decision makers’ capacity to detect patterns of sequential dependency improves performance
in evolving environments. This capacity exists even at the novice level but appears to require
significant experience to refine. For instance, in a recently studied inventory management
task, subjects who had prior experience with a more complex inventory task displayed
significantly better ability in predicting the overall future shape of inventory’s trajectory
than subjects who did not have this experience (Sweeney and Sterman, 2000, Manufacturing
Case). However, these subjects still did not display a level of understanding that would have
led to re-equilibration of inventory. In the work reported here, when novices’ workflow
focused them on debtors displaying a consistent pattern of sequential dependencies over a
longer period of time, they were able to recognize this signature pattern in a new type of
bargaining opponent and quickly achieve a high level of performance.
From a practical standpoint, the question is how to implement this workflow strategy
in functioning environments. The work reported here suggests that, in defining system
requirements, task experts should be able to identify the higher level features they use
to identify dependencies and thereby the data that helps them determine whether those
features are present. In the functioning environment on which the task used here was
based, workflows were derived using factors that experts felt affected the likelihood of the
debtor responding to different negotiating strategies such as time delinquent and amount of
delinquency (Gibson and Fichman, 2002).
How does this workflow strategy fare against the level of change inherent in dynamic
environments? Three distinct cases that may occur in combination present themselves. In
the first, the same features remain relevant for identifying the dependency, but the effec-
tiveness of different decision options changes. For instance, customers who once readily
responded to efforts to get them to raise their initial commitments may become willing
to raise these commitments only half as much. In this case, information systems imple-
menting the workflow strategy will not require change because the same factors remain
relevant for identifying sequential dependencies. However, decision makers will have to
learn new responses to the dependency. The S-L model suggests that this learning will be
proportionately less than suggested by the performance of the Consistent subjects in this
study because decision makers will not have to relearn higher level features that identify
the dependencies.
In the second case, a more serious challenge presents itself when previously identified
higher level features are no longer relevant in recognizing sequential dependencies, but the
data required to recognize the dependencies does not change. This case is similar to that
faced by Diehl and Sterman’s (1995) subjects and Evolving subjects in this study who dealt
with sequential dependencies of different lengths in each session. As in the first case, the
system does not have to be altered. However, lengthier time on task, proportionate to that
for Consistent subjects in this study, is required for decision makers to relearn higher level
features that identify relevant sequential dependencies.
In the third case, the most serious challenge of the three cases presents itself when different
data elements become important for identifying relevant higher level features. For example
in credit collections, similarly to other sales and customer service tasks, the natural or
economic conditions in a given geographic region may change causing customers to behave
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differently. In such cases, knowing the customer’s region may become more important for
identifying the state of the interaction than it was previously. Any solution to this case
involves both changing the system and relearning higher level features that identify relevant
dependencies. In such cases, an information system that cannot be easily reconfigured to
display more relevant information will be a hindrance. Of course such flexibility is not
without costs, and the trade off is likely to be domain specific.
Finally, the work reported here suggests future research that can inform the design of inter-
faces for dynamic decision environments. The task interface used in this study represented
state variables and offer options as discrete entities. Most, if not all, previous experiments
with dynamic tasks have used continuous indicators for current state and decision options
(e.g., expected software project duration and number of software developers, Sengupta and
Abdel-Hamid, 1993). The use of continuous state indicators and decision variables is justi-
fied by the observation that, in the aggregate, many business phenomena can be viewed in
terms of continuous flows (Sweeney and Sterman, 2000). The problem with using contin-
uous indicators is that they may make recognizing states and their associated actions more
difficult by making them seem less similar. For instance, it is less clear that an individual
who in a sequence of offers agreed to pay $150 and then $225 is similar to one who agreed
to pay $175 and then $250 than it is if both individuals are indicated as having agreed to
pay the lowest possible amount (equivalent to an L offer in the work reported here) and then
an amount equivalent to their usual monthly payment (equivalent to an M offer here). In
tacit recognition that decision makers perform better when similarities between states are
more salient, many customer service organizations gear their information systems toward
providing categorical data that facilitates drawing similarities and distinctions over patterns
of behavior (e.g., the offer category scheme just mentioned). Formally testing these conjec-
tures concerning the differential effectiveness of interfaces that use discrete and continuous
variables to represent dynamic environments is a topic for future research.
5.3. Conclusion
In increasingly prevalent dynamic decision environments such as direct sales, customer
support, and electronically mediated bargaining, decision makers must make sequences of
interdependent decisions. Past decision support efforts have focused on relieving the deci-
sion maker of the need to explicitly account for dependencies between decisions. However,
such systems themselves are fragile to change and further do not focus on enhancing deci-
sion makers’ capacities to deal with change. This study has presented an alternative strategy
that defines information systems requirements in terms of enhancing decision makers’ abil-
ity to learn patterns of sequential dependency between decisions. In so doing, the study
has introduced a simulation model of how decision makers learn sequential dependencies
in order to predict the relative impact of different strategies for improving decision mak-
ers’ performance. When a system was used to manage workflows in a way predicted by
the model to enhance learning, decision makers were able to learn underlying patterns of
sequential dependencies, not just their superficial manifestation. This result suggests that
a fundamental shift, away from substituting for cognitive deficits and toward enhancing
sequential pattern learning, is appropriate in how we support decision makers in dynamic
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environments. As detailed in this study, this shift has important implications for designing
system workflows and potential future applications in interface design.
Appendix A: Detailed Simulation Settings and Assumptions
Instantiating the learning model required: (1) determining the models’ representation of
the offer options (H, M, or L); (2) hypothesizing the representation of the information
considered by decision makers in making each offer; (3) and determining the number of
higher level features the model could recognize. We address each of these in turn and then
briefly examine the mechanics of how models made offers and learned in the simulation
study.
The three offer possibilities were represented as separate action options using Eq. (1).
The principal information subjects used as they made offers appeared to be their last offer
paired with the debtor’s response. Subjects were assumed to perceive offer-debtor-response
pairs as a single discrete unit, a representation commonly assumed in cognitive game theory
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, Chapter 4), repeated decision making (Dienes and Fahey,
1995), and skill automatization (Logan, 1988). For instance, if the subject made a high offer
and the debtor rejected, the subject would encode that offer-response pair as high-offer-
reject. In the simulation, a 1-of-n vector representation was used to capture this perceptual
encoding. Since there were three possible offers and two possible responses, the vector
had a length of six with 1 being placed in the position of the offer-response pair that had
occurred and 0 in the other positions.3
Given the construction of the task, higher level features were patterns of offers and
responses. As for determining the number of higher level features the model should be able
to recognize, theory is relatively silent, even under idealized circumstances (Mitchell, 1997,
pp. 218–220). Therefore, the number of higher level features that the model was able to
recognize was varied between five and fifteen in increments of five. No effect was found
on the overall pattern of results, but models with fifteen higher level features appeared to
learn more reliably. Therefore, models capable of recognizing 15 higher-level features were
used.
At the start of each simulation experiment, the model weights were set to small random
values close to 0. This assumption caused models to display individual learning charac-
teristics since the different weights for each model represented different priors concerning
which offer to select at the start of learning (Bishop, 1996). Therefore, eighteen models
were run in each condition to estimate average performance for one and two-stage models.
Since the model’s behavior was fully determined by the weights, the weights’ initial ran-
dom values caused the model to initially display random decision behavior. This behavior
does not follow Raiffa’s (1982) observations of convergence during bargaining which sug-
gest that bargainers may follow a strategy of asking for more if the previous offer is accepted
and asking for less if the previous offer is rejected. To instantiate this initial behavior in
models, they were trained to maker offers that were one level lower than offers that had
immediately just been rejected and to make offers that were one level higher than offers
that had been immediately accepted for five contacts before commencing the simulation
experiment of human subjects.
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The mechanics of both this initial pretraining and the learning during the simulated
experiment were identical. For each offer, a vector representing the decision context was
presented as the input to the higher level features. It contained the 1-of-n representation of
the last offer-response pair and the activations of the higher level features at the moment
of making the last offer.4 The current activation of each higher level feature was then
calculated by substituting the input vector and appropriate weights into Eq. (2), and then
substituting that result into Eq. (3). The activation of the higher level features then served
as the inputs into the choice of offer to make. The choice of offer was determined by
calculating each offer’s cumulative evidence using Eq. (2), estimating the probability of the
offer being chosen using Eq. (1), and finally choosing randomly from the offers based on
the likelihoods just estimated.
After the offer was made the debtor algorithm responded using one of the STD’s from
figure 3 based on session and experimental condition for each offer in a contact. This
response was used by the backpropagation algorithm in learning as specified by Eqs. (4)–
(7). In the results reported, the learning rate η from Eq. (4) was set to 0.08 with similar
patterns of results produced when η was varied between 0.05 and 0.12.
Notes
1. At the very start of a contact, this “best” move involved making an offer that would lead to the possibility of
getting an offer accepted on the next speaker turn.
2. Other approaches for collapsing the sequential dependency were possible. This approach treated the reject
nodes from the 2-offer STD equivalently to the Accept(H ) and Accept(M) nodes.
3. Alternative representations are possible, in particular representing the last offer and debtor response separately.
This and other alternative representations were tried without affecting the general pattern of simulation results
reported presently.
4. At the start of each contact, no offers had been made, so the value for the offer-response pair and all prior higher
level feature activations were set to 0.
References
Beam, C., A. Segev, M. Bichler and R. Krishnan (1999), “On Negotiations and Deal Making in Electronic Markets,”
Information Systems Frontiers, 1(3), 241–258.
Bishop, C.M. (1996), Neural Networks for Pattern Recognition. Oxford University Press, New York.
Brehmer, B. (1995), “Feedback Delays in Complex Dynamic Decision Tasks,” in P. Frensch and J. Funke (Eds.)
Complex Problem Solving: The European Perspective, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Camerer, C.F. and R.M. Hogarth (1999), “The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and
Capital-Labor-Production Framework,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1–3), 7–42.
Cialdini, R.B. (1984), Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. William Morrow, New York.
Cleeremans, A. and J.L. McClelland (1991), “Learning the Structure of Event Sequences,” Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 120, 235–253.
Davis, F.D. and J.E. Kottemann (1995), “Determinants of Decision Rule Use in a Production Planning Task,”
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 64(2), 145–157.
Diehl, E. and J.D. Sterman (1995), “Effects of Feedback Complexity on Dynamic Decision Making,” Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62(2), 198–215.
Dienes, Z. and R. Fahey (1995), “Role of Specific Instances in Controlling a Dynamic System,” Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21(4), 1–15.
Elman, J.L. (1990), “Finding Structure in Time,” Cognitive Science, 14(2), 179–211.
326 GIBSON
Fudenberg, D. and D.K. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games. The MIT Press, Cambridge.
Gibson, F.P. (2000), “Feedback Delays: How can Decision Makers Learn not to Buy a New Car Every Time the
Garage is Empty?” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83(1), 141–166.
Gibson, F.P. and M. Fichman (2002), “When Threats and Encouragements are Effective: The Case of Credit
Collectors,” Unpublished Manuscript (in revision).
Joslyn, S. and E. Hunt (1998), “Evaluating Individual Differences in Response to Time-Pressure Situations,”
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 4(1), 16–43.
Judd, C.M. and G.H. McClelland (1989), Data Analysis: A Model Comparison Approach. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, San Diego, CA.
Kanfer, R. and P. Ackerman (1989), “Motivation and Cognitive Abilities: An Integrative/Aptitude Treatment
Interaction Approach to Skill Acquisition,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 74(4), 657–690.
Kimbrough, S.O., D.J. Wu and F. Zhong (2002), “Computers Play the Beer Game: Can Artificial Agents Manage
Supply Chains,” Decision Support Systems, 33, 323–333.
Klein, G.A., J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood and C.E. Zsambok (Eds.) (1993), Decision Making in Action: Models and
Methods. Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, NJ.
Logan, G.D. (1988), “Toward an Instance Theory of Automatization,” Psychological Review, 95(4), 492–527.
McClelland, J.L. (2001), The Mit Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, Chap. Cognitive Modeling, Connection-
ist. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Available on-line at http://cognet.mit.edu/MITECS/Entry/mcclelland.html.
Mitchell, T.M. (1997), Machine Learning. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Rafaeli, A. and R.I. Sutton (1991), “Emotional Contrast Strategies as Means of Social Influence: Lessons from
Criminal Interrogators and Bill Collectors,” Academy of Management Journal, 34(4), 749–775.
Raiffa, H. (1982), The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Rohde, D.L.T. and D.C. Plaut (1999), “Language Acquisition in the Absence of Explicit Negative Evidence: How
Important is Starting Small?” Cognition, 72, 67–109.
Roth, A.E. and I. Erev (1995), “Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic
Models in the Intermediate Term,” Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164–212.
Rumelhart, D.E., R. Durbin, R. Golden and Y. Chauvin (1995), “Backpropagation: The Basic Theory,” in Y.
Chauvin and D.E. Rumelhart (Eds.) Back-Propagation: Theory, Architectures, and Applications, Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Sengupta, K. and T.K. Abdel-Hamid (1993), “Alternative Conceptions of Feedback in Dynamic Decision Envi-
ronments: An Experimental Investigation,” Management Science, 39(4), 411–428.
Stanley, W.B., R.C. Mathews, R.R. Buss and S. Kotler-Cope (1989), “Insight Without Awareness: On the Inter-
action of Verbalization, Instruction, and Practice in a Simulated Process Control Task,” Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 41A(3), 553–577.
Sterman, J.D. (1989a), “Misperceptions of Feedback in Dynamic Decision Making,” Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 43, 301–335.
Sterman, J.D. (1989b), “Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision
Making Experiment,” Management Science, 35(3), 321–339.
Sterman, J.D. (1994), “Learning in and About Complex Systems,” System Dynamics Review, 10(2/3), 291–330.
Sterman, J.D. (2000), Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World. Irwin McGraw-
Hill, Boston.
Sutton, R.I. (1991), “Maintaining Norms About Expressed Emotions: The Case of Bill Collectors,” Administrative
Science Quarterly, 36, 245–268.
Sweeney, L.B. and J.D. Sterman (2000), “Bathtub Dynamics: Initial Results of a Systems Thinking Inventory,”
System Dynamics Review, 16(4), 249–286.
Bud Gibson is an Assistant Professor of Business Information Technology at Michigan Business School. He
received his Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University and his MBA from the Wharton School. Research interests
include decision making, Internet-based collaboration, and social network engineering.
